









The Kawousan War was one of the longest periods of 
resistance known in Niger and through it the local people – 
Tuareg, Hausa and others – fought to free their society 
from French colonial domination. Unlike other 
interpretations, this chapter looks at the structural causes 
of the war related to the ecology and economy of the area, 
the influence of French colonial politics on the nomadic 
lifestyle, and Islam. It also considers the decisive role of the 
individual leaders, the breakdown of Tuareg confederations 
and the creation of new political unities, and the reduction 
in the powers of the regional chiefs. The effect the 
Kawousan War had on regions outside the immediate 
vicinity of the fighting is also investigated. The causes of the 
war were multi-faceted and made it more than purely a 





The most important anti-colonial period of resistance in Niger in popular 
memory is the Yakin Kawousan or the Kawousan War, which may well have 
been the longest, the best organized and equipped of all previous anti-colonial 
wars of resistance. The military post at Agadez was under siege for about 80 
days from 13 December 1916 to 3 March 1917 and the war then continued in 
the mountainous Ayir region, ending only with the deaths of the main leaders: 
Kawousan on 5 January 1919 and Tagama during the night of 29-30 April 1920. 
The fierce fighting and opposition to the colonial system lasted for some 40 
months.  
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 The Kawousan War was the subject of numerous reports at the time.1 Many 
historians and anthropologists have taken an interest in the events that raised so 
much controversy.2 The various interpretations have their weaknesses as they 
have tended to focus on a description of events, especially on political and 
military issues. The revolt has also been likened to a simple act of looting or 
pillage, or at the most to a Sanûssi-influenced3 anti-French religious movement 
organized by Italy and Germany against France. These judgements hide the 
complexity of an event whose deeper roots resurfaced at the start of colonial 
occupation. In this chapter I critically analyse various types of material: oral 
historical sources from a visit to Agadez during July and August 1985, AOF4 
archival material in Dakar, information gleaned from the archives of the former 
Cercles of Zinder, Agadez and Niamey, documents written at the time, and 
other related works on the subject. 
 To be interpreted correctly, the Kawousan War has to be placed in the 
region’s socio-political and economic context of the time since the actual causes 
of the revolt were essentially socio-political and economic and such 
explanations often have deep structural causes. Here I propose to show the 
impact of colonial domination on socio-economic life, to discuss the true role of 
the chiefs and local noblemen, and to describe the repercussions of the revolt in 
other regions. This information is used to analyse the different interpretations 
for the reasons behind this revolt and to propose an alternative view. 
                                                 
1 M. Allane, Relations de Voyage de Mohamed Allane à Djanet et à Ghât, recueillie M. 
Abridat, officier interprète de reserve (undated); H. Boubou, ‘Documents Nigériens, 
tome I, l’Aïr’; R. Gaffiot, L’Aïr en Feu, ronéo (undated); P. Mangeot, ‘Le Siège 
d’Agadez Raconté par un Prisonnier de Kaosen’, Renseignements Coloniaux et 
Documents, 8 (1930), 479-82; Colonel Abadie, Afrique Centrale: La Colonie du Niger 
(Paris, 1927).  
2 A. Bourgeot, ‘Les Echanges Transsahariens, la Senousiya et les Révoltes Twareg de 
l’Aïr de 1916-1917’, Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines, 69-70, XVIII, 1-2 (1978), 159-85; F. 
Fuglestad, ‘Les Révoltes des Tuareg du Niger (1916-1917)’, Cahiers d’Etudes 
Africaines, 13 (1973), 49; K. Muhammad Zubairu, ‘The Kaoussen Rebellion of 1916-
1918 with Particular Reference to its Impact on Northern Nigeria’, PhD thesis, Ahmadu 
Bello University (Zaria, 1973); H.T. Norris, The Tuareg: Their Islamic Legacy and its 
Diffusion in the Sahel (Warminster, 1975); Y. Riou, La Révolte de Kaocen et le Siège 
d’Agadez, 1916-1917, ronéo (1968); J.L. Triaud, ‘Un Episode Oubliée de la Guerre de 
Kaossen: La Lettre des Marabouts d’Agadez au Colonel Mourin (4 mars 1917)’, 
Annales de l’Université de Niamey, no. 2 (1978), 263-71; A. Salifou, Kawousan ou la 
Révolte Sénoussiste, Etudes Nigériennes no. 33 (Niamey, 1973). 
3 The Sanûssi is an Islamic brotherhood that organized resistance to the French. 
  
4 Afrique Occidentale Française. 
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Map 8.1  Areas of resistance during the Kawousan War
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The roots of the revolt 
 
The occupation and administration of the Ayir, Kawar and Djado 
To connect its possessions in North Africa with the Atlantic Coast and to build 
a French-African bloc, France had first to conquer the Sahara and central and 
western Sudan. The Sahara served not only as military and political cover vis-à-
vis Nigeria and as a protective barrier for the Algerian hinterland but also 
provided a transit route and link for trade between the Mediterranean and 
Sudan. 
 The first official French military mission to the Niger Sahara is known as the 
Foureau-Lamy Mission and is recognized as the first act of French colonization 
in the Ayir region. This mission’s aim was to join the Sahara with the French 
Sudan,5 and to mark the French presence in the region, thus preventing the 
ambitions of the Ottoman Empire in Kawar. The treaties signed between August 
and November 1899 with the Sultans of Agadez, Tessaoua and Zinder and the 
delegates of the Sultan of Bilma helped to consolidate the French position in the 
region. The conquest and subsequent occupation of the Nigerian Sahara had five 
objectives: to stop the progressive expansion of the Turks; to prevent any 
German ambitions in the area; to access Niger from Algeria and to find the best 
way to supply Niger militarily from there; to ensure the safety of caravan routes 
between Damergou and Damagaram and those coming from Tripoli;6 and to 
prepare for the conquest of Tibesti. 
 According to the political and administrative plans in these regions, French 
colonization aimed to reduce the authority of the regional chiefs and to 
consciously maintain a degree of tension between the nomadic and sedentary 
populations, and between the warring and religious nobles. For example, the 
colonial administration put pressure on the Tuareg imajaren (warrior) clan until 
the start of the Kawousan War. After the repression came a period of ‘political 
maraboutism’ with the election of the marabouts’ chiefs (ineslimen). The 
French occupiers could not tolerate the lifestyle of these desert populations, 
particularly that of the nomadic Tuareg who carried out raids, were involved in 
itinerant animal husbandry and observed a strong social hierarchy. This way of 
life was not compatible with a modern state system with the values of equality 
for all, and where the control of people and resources was pivotal to all political 
                                                 
5 It had to join Lake Chad with the Voulet-Chanoine mission in Central Africa and the 
Congo-Chad mission led by Gentil. 
  
6 A.N.F. Paris, Vincennes, S.H.A., Niger 3, dossier III, Sous/dossier a, pièce 2, Sous-
lieutenant Jean, commandant la colonne du Damergou: Rapport sur la Question de 
l’Azbin, Djajidouna, 18 mars 1904. A.N.N., Niamey, Instructions du Résident à Zinder, 
Peroz, au commandant du poste de Guidjigaoua, RASH Y (1972), 60. 
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activities. The aristocratic Tuareg, therefore, had to be disbanded. This 
dislocation passed for the suppression of slavery under the form of collective 
dependency in breaking the ties of bondage and in encouraging the autonomy of 
servile tribes and their dependants. In return, reports of social domestic 
servitude were ignored and the aristocratic Tuareg were allowed to keep their 
domestic slaves.7  
 The break-up of the aristocratic Tuareg followed the abandonment of 
confederations and the establishment, in their place, of a policy of enforced 
sedentarization. In the Tuareg nomadic zones, artificial political groups were 
created with their own autonomy8 and formerly independent tribes were placed 
under the authority of the Sultan of Agadez. In the Kawar, in spite of its low 
population density and an acephalous political system, previously stateless 





The decline in caravan traffic 
The logic of French policy declared that the submission of the aristocratic 
Tuareg groups could be realized by depriving them of their military and 
economic power – the Trans-Saharan caravan traffic.10  
 Military operations were the most important factor in the decline of the inter-
regional caravan traffic. Operations of conquest and pacification deprived the 
local people of the capital that was the main focus of long-distance exchanges, 
namely camels. Massive reductions in the number of camels resulted in a loss of 
livelihood for an important group of Tuareg who lived off this commercial 
trade, as well as for all the other people involved such as guides and escorts. 
                                                 
7 This emancipation of dependants remained formal. Slavery in itself rarely led to 
uncertainty and the trade in slaves was pursued in this region to such an extent that 
trans-Saharan trade kept its dynamism.  
8 See P. Bonte, ‘Esclavage et Relation de Dépendance chez les Tuareg Kel Gress’, in C. 
Meillassoux (ed.), L’Esclavage en Afrique Précoloniale (Maspéro, 1975), 49-76; E. & 
S. Bernus, ‘L’Evolution de la Condition Servile chez les Tuaregs Sahéliens’, in C. 
Meillassoux (ed.), L’Esclavage en Afrique Précoloniale (Maspéro, 1975), 27-48. 
9 Capitaine Hautefeuille, ‘Les Origines de l’Islam au Kawar’, Documents du Centre des 
Hautes Etudes sur l’Afrique Noire, 1654 (1950), 7; J. Chapelle, Nomades Noirs du 
Sahara (Paris, 1957). 
10 Bourgeot, ‘Les Echanges Transsahariens’, 162-65. 
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Losses increased to around 40% in the Cercle of Zinder, 30% in the Cercle of 
Madaoua and 60% in the Cercle of Agadez, according to official reports.11 
  
The 1912-1915 famine 
While trade was declining in the north, Niger as a whole was experiencing an 
exceptionally bad famine that lasted from 1912 to 1915. Fiscal pressures, 
problems in the caravan trade as well as levies on foodstuffs and livestock all 
contributed to the effects of the famine in the Ayir in 1913: 
 
Il sévit actuellement dans tout le cercle d’Agadez une disette qui fait de nombreuses 
victimes. Les habitants sont partis en masse vers le sud et il ne reste plus personne 
au nord d’Agadez. Ceux qui y sont encore mangent les quelques graines et fruits 
comestibles des arbres de la zone désertique mais cette nourriture peu substantielle 
ne les soutient guère et ils meurent de faim en grand nombre…12 
 
Economic consequences of the conquest of Tibesti 
The conquest of Tibesti started in September 1913 and lasted until July 1916 
when it was finally evacuated and then abandoned, with the requisitioning of 
men, food products and camels from neighbouring areas, first Agadez and later 
N’guigmi, Zinder and Madaoua. 
 
Une grande partie des animaux de l’azalai fut réquisitionnée à Bilma pour la 
colonne du Tibesti et bien peu revinrent: les propriétaires ne furent pas 
dédommagés de leurs pertes; le mécontentement qui en résulta ne compta-t-il pas 
pour beaucoup dans les raisons qui menèrent à la révolte? On peut le 
supposer…Cette question est importante et est le gros sujet de mécontentement des 
tribus nomades dont la principale, presque l’unique ressource est le chameau…13 
 
In 1915 the people in Ayir provided about 850 camels for the Tibesti caravans 
in response to 1,100 requests for animals.14 The drought and a lack of pasture 
exacerbated losses and resulted in a decline in the north-south caravan trade 
with the number of caravans being cut to half their original number between 
                                                 
11 Archives Nationales du Sénégal, Dakar, 2 G 14-4, NIGER à AOF, Rapport Agricole, 
4ème trimestre 1914, 7. 
12 Archives Nationales du Niger, Rapport Politique du Cercle d’Agadez, 2ème trimestre 
1914, Agadez le 30 juin 1914. 
13 Capitaine Fonferrier, ‘Etudes Historiques sur le Mouvement Caravanier dans le 
Cercle d’Agadez’, Bulletin du Comité d’Etudes Historiques et Scientifiques de l’A.O.F. 
(1932), 305. 
  
14 Archives Nationales du Niger, Agadez, Commandant du Cercle d’Agadez au 
Lieutenant-Colonel Commissaire du Gouvernement Général au Territoire Militaire du 
Niger, Agadez le 9 juin 1916. 
 The Kawousan War reconsidered 197 
1912 and 1914. At the time of the 1912 annual caravan, 16,821 camels were 
recorded in Bilma and 6,721 in Fachi as compared to 8,220 and 2,410 
respectively in 1914.15 
 
 
The political and military situation before the revolt 
 
On 27 July 1916, Sub-lieutenant Lenoir, commander of the forces at Tibesti, 
decided to evacuate the posts at Bardaye and Zouar and to abandon Tibesti. The 
official reason given was the problem in defending the post in the face of an 
imminent Sanûssi attack.16 Lenoir had undoubtedly seen that the political 
situation was giving cause for concern. Unrest was spreading in the north and 
the northeast and especially in the Ayir region. Echoes of the fighting by the 
Sanûssi in the north, the revolt by the Tuareg in the west,17 and finally the 
hurried departure of the French troops from Tibesti all contributed to the 
radicalization of local anti-colonial resistance. Regular raids started to spread 
from Ayir to Damergou, Ader and Tarka.18 Such acts, however, remained 
unpunished, testifying once again to a reduction in the power and influence of 
the colonizers. 
 The French administration was being threatened from all sides and was 
incapable of containing demonstrations against its presence, in part because of 
the influence of the First World War raging in Europe. Captain Sabatié, Captain 
Bosch’s successor as head of the Cercle of Agadez as of 1 December 1916, 
inherited a precarious situation because the second company of the 3rd 
Senegalese rifle battalion based at Agadez was weak and widely dispersed. 
Captain Sabatié tried to reinforce the defence of the post of Agadez and 
demanded reinforcements from Zinder. By deciding to take a different approach 
from that suggested by his predecessor, Captain Sabatié displayed a certain 
amount of flair just a few days before the attack. Who were the leaders of this 
famous revolt? How was it planned and who was involved? 
                                                 
15 Archives Nationales du Niger, Niamey, Cercle d’Agadez, Rapport Politique, 4ème 
trimestre 1912 et 1914. 
16 Archives Nationales du Niger, Niamey, 21-0-29, ‘Rapport du Sous-Lieutenant Lenoir 
commandant le confrérieur du Tibesti et le poste de Bardaye sur les circonstances qui 
ont amené cet officier à abandonner les postes de Bardaye et de Zouar, et à évacuer le 
Tibesti’, Faya le 25 août 1916, 23 pages manuscrites. 
17 It concerns primarily the revolt of Firhoun. 
18 Archives Nationales du Sénégal, Dakar, 2 G 16-13, Niger à AOF, Rapport Politique, 
3ème trimestre 1916, Zinder le 28 octobre 1916. 
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Kawousan ag Kedda 
Copyright: ‘Touaregs exil et résistance’, Revue du Monde Musulman et de la 
Méditerranée, 57 (Paris, 1990) 
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The leaders and their doctrine 
 
Mouhamad Kawousan ag Gedda 
Mouhamad Kawousan ag Gedda was an Ikaskazen Igerzawen born in the Ayir 
towards the end of the nineteenth century.19 He did not inherit a title from his 
father nor was he born into a chiefdom endowed with incarnate politico-military 
power. His tribe was not descended from a political power. He was affiliated to 
a junior line that hierarchically occupied a subordinate position and could not 
accede to a title of aghola or tribal chief.20 By way of compensation, his mother 
was a noble in the Igerzawen chieftaincy.21 
 As a young man, Kawousan had taken part in the exodus of certain Tuareg 
groups that wanted to withdraw from French domination and he stayed in 
Kanem where he participated in the anti-colonial struggle against the French. 
He was in Gouro when he got in contact with – or attached himself to, 
according to some – the anti-European El Hirwan (The Brothers) movement 
connected to the Sanûssi.22 This would have been in August 1909. In November 
of the same year, he participated on the side of Abdallah Tower, chief of the 
Sanûssi Zawiya of Aïn Galaka, in the attack on the French camp of Washenkale 
commanded by Lieutenant Moutot.23 Progressively, and thanks to his courage 
and intelligence, Kawousan acquired the esteem of the powerful brotherhood’s 
leader. He developed a strong friendship with Sidi Ahmed Sherif, the head of 
the Sanûssiya, who appointed him Governor of Ennedi. He was involved in the 
war for a while with the Italians and later was harassed by the French troops of 
Commmander Hilaire and forced to take refuge in Darfour for nine months from 
August 1910 to May 1911. He left Darfour in August 1912 at the end of the 
conflict with the powerful sultan, Ali Dinar. Threatened on all fronts, he gave 
himself up to the French who put camels at his disposal allowing him to 
proceed towards Ounyanga Kebir in the Ennedi region. The Turks had just 
installed themselves in Borkou, and Kawousan offered his services to their 
                                                 
19 All the authors then adopted, according to colonial archives, the name Wan Teggida 
which was unknown to the population. According to the same authors, Kawousan 
would have been born in Damergou around 1880. H. Claudot-Hawad, ‘Exil et 
Résistance ou la Continuité Touarègue’, Revue du Monde Musulman et de 
Méditerranée, 57 (1990), 29. 
20 A. Bourgeot, ‘Révoltes et Rébellions en Pays Tuareg’, Afrique Contemporaine, 170 
(1994), 8. 
21 Claudot-Hawad, ‘Exil et Résistance’, 30. 
22 Information Rhoubeidi, Agadez, August 1985. 
23 Archives Nationales du Niger, AGADEZ, Territoire Tchad au Territoire Niger, 30 
janvier 1917. 
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leader, Kaïmakan d’Aïn Galaka, and followed him to Ennedi. In May 1913 they 
found themselves involved in the Battle of Oum-Et-Adam on the side of the 
Sanûssi overthrown by French troops. Kawousan regrouped, left Borkou and 
withdrew to the oasis at Timmerin. There is no information about his activities 
there until April 1915 when he helped his friend Sidi Mahdi Souni, the son of 
Mohammed Souni, against the Italians. In February 1916, he was seen in the 
Tripolitanian Djebel. He returned to Ghât in August after the Italians had 
occupied Janet with an army estimated to be made up of 200 regular soldiers 
and six canons. Four months later, Kawousan besieged the French post at 
Agadez with the help of Sultan Tagama. 
 
Abderahamane Tagama Ag Bagari 
Abderahamane Tagama Ag Bagari was roughly 40 years of age in December 
1916, about the same age as Kawousan. From a young age he had studied the 
Koran in Agadez and had then become involved in petty trade, following the 
caravans south to the markets along the Kano-Katsina-Sokoto road. He lived in 
Bornou and then in Kano where he resumed his studies but at a higher level. He 
was still in Kano when he was asked to take up the head of the sultanate. He 
ascended the throne in 1908 as successor to Ibrahim Ed-Dasouqi who was 
judged ‘feeble and incapable’ by the French.24 Although put in place by 
colonization, Tagama, like his father Sultan Mohammed Al Baqary dit Bâ 
Sôfô,25 lived modestly and was generous towards his people, especially during 
the 1912-1915 famine.26 
 In addition to these two leaders, two other people who played a decisive role 
in this event should be mentioned. As chiefs of war, political leaders and 
members of the aristocracy, the participation of Fona and El Moctar Kodogo 
Ben Mohamed brought about a loyalty between the elements of the warring 
group in the Kawousan War. Fona was an agholla (chief) of Kel Tafidet who 
participated in all the major battles against the French before 1916 in the Ayir, 
Damergou, Agram and Tibesti. After becoming Kawousan’s lieutenant, he led 
the resistance in Tibesti and Kawar where he participated in the sacking of 
                                                 
24 Information Malam Yaro, Agadez, August 1985. 
25 ‘Al Baqary est considéré comme un roi philosophe, (Waliyi-n-sarki) qui refuse de 
puiser sa nourriture dans les finances de la ville et qui vit très modestement. Il est l’un 
des rares sultans à être enterré dans le cimetière du palais.’ A. Adamou, Agadez et sa 
Région, Thèse de 3ème cycle en géographie (1976), 81. 
  
26 The famine was first called Yunwa Tagama (the ‘Famine of Tagama’) due to the 
important quantities of food the Sultan procured from his own personal resources to 
distribute to the people. 
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Fachi in 1918. Kodogo was the son of an old Ikaskazen chief. He left in 
dissidence, as did Kawousan.  
 
 
The siege of the French post at Agadez 
 
The revolt extended beyond the borders of the Ayir region. Virtually all the 
groups in the Ayir were involved in the action in one way or another and to 
varying degrees over time. Groups of people alone or under the leadership of 
their chiefs joined the resistance fighters. The Kel Ajjer made up Kawousan’s 
original force before his arrival in the Ayir; Moussa ag Amastane was in charge 
of the Kel Ahaggar; Mohammed Ibrahim – the chief of the Almouskare – led 
the Arabs from Tahoua, and the Amenokal Al Khorar led the Kel Dinnik. The 
Kel Nan of Azawak, Taitoq of In Gall, Ifadayen, Toubou of Kawar and Tibesti, 
all people of the Damergou and certain villages in the sedentary cantons close to 
the desert regions of Manga and Damagaram also took part in the uprising. 
 How can such enthusiasm be explained? It came without doubt initially as a 
result of people’s declining living conditions, and historical ties through 
religious and tribal solidarity also united these people. The role of the leaders 
should not, however, be underestimated. Without pretending to put the results 
of history down only to the role of great men, it is enough to stress the real 
impact politicians can have on their people and in the process of revolt. As far 
as Abderahamane Tagama was concerned, his role was decisive and central 
although this does not emerge from written documents. He was at the heart of 
this resistance movement because he knew how to channel the diverse 
dissatisfactions and to assemble around him the necessary forces required for 
the fight, not in order to realize his own personal ambitions but to respond to 
collective aspirations. 
 
Kawousan et Tagama ont conjugé leurs efforts. La révolte aurait pu être déclenchée 
sans Kawousan s’il y avait des armes, Kawousan a apporté les armes. Mais c’est un 
inconnu. Rien n’aurait pu être entrepris sans Tagama à qui appartient le pays et qui 
jouissait de l’estime des populations.27  
 
Bourgeot supports this point of view: ‘Tegama demeure un allié irréprochable 
sans lequel Kaosen et ses partisans n’auraient été que des bandes de pillard’.28 
 More so than Kawousan, Tagama was the spiritual leader and the ideological 
force behind the resistance, and was the most politically minded of the people 
                                                 
27 Information Rhoubeidi. 
28 Bourgeot, ‘Les Echanges Transsahariens’, 171, note 24. 
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involved in the movement. He was not a professional military man but more an 
ideologist and an active propagandist who knew how to undertake patiently, 
discretely and methodically the job of mobilizing and sensitizing the local 
people, whose interests and positions were not always convergent. The Ayir, in 
spite of its relative ethnic homogeneity, did not constitute a unified political 
whole: three zones of political influence split the region. The eastern and 
mountainous areas were under the political and military control of the Kel 
Ewey, legally the dependants of the Anastafidet. They were constantly fighting 
the Tuareg of Damergou who regularly pilfered their caravans. The In Gall 
region was under the influence of the Kel Fadey while the Kel Ferwam was the 
predominant group in Agadez and in the western highlands, regions where 
theoretically the Sultan’s power was limited. In addition, there was the original 
sedentary population of Songhay origin who were Hausa speaking and 
accounted for a large part of the population of Agadez. The town and the 
surrounding regions had 2,490 and 25,872 inhabitants respectively in 1916.29 
 Tagama’s chief merit was to have been able, through dialogue, to realize a 
large regrouping of volunteers and to organize and unite them as a group against 
the common enemy, in spite of the cleavages created by wars in the nineteenth 
century, and the policy of division and terror pursued by the French colonial 
administration. It is equally to the credit of these populations that they were able 
to reach a degree of consciousness and establish a sense of internal cohesion. It 
is now possible, thanks to the written evidence of witnesses received by the 
colonial authorities after the revolt, to assess the central role Tagama played in 
the events.30  
 
Tégama était le seul maître: tout le monde lui obéissait31 
Tégama commandait à tous32  
 
Tagama was the movement’s principal leader who, both ideologically and 
politically, was able to inspire people and develop strategies. He discretely 
made preparations before Kawousan’s arrival. 
 
                                                 
29 Archives Nationales du Sénégal, Dakar, 22 G 33: Niger. Statistiques Générales 1916. 
Annuaire de l’A.O.F. 1916. 
30 Archives Nationales du Niger, Niamey, ‘Affaire Tegama’, Cercle d’Agadez, 2-7-2. 
31 Archives Nationales du Niger, Cercle d’Agadez, 2-7-2, no. 2, dépositions du témoin 
Massadou. 
  
32 Archives Nationales du Niger, Cercle d’Agadez, 2-7-2, no. 3, dépositions du témoin 
Mamadou. 
 The Kawousan War reconsidered 203 
Seul Tagama savait quand Kawousan arriverait. Personne n’était dans le secret. 
C’est un homme extrêmement discret et rusé.33 
 
Available data do not allow an accurate description of preparations or of the 
first contacts between Kawousan and Tagama, although a letter from Sidi 
Mohammed El Labid to the Sultan is dated 1913 or 1914. By the beginning of 
1916, Tagama was diverting the attention of Captain Bosch from the troubles 
that were unfolding in Ayir. From April 1916, the commander of the cercle 
issued orders demanding that the post be defended.34 
 Tagama continued his diversionary actions until Captain Sabatié took up his 
position and recognized the extraordinary effort that Tagama had made to curb 
the colonial administration’s power in Agadez without arising any suspicions 
and to ease the infiltration of the Sanûssi.35 It was during the first part of 1916 
that Tagama could skilfully have had assassinated one of his closest 
collaborators, Elhadj Tourawa Melle, who was on very good terms with the 
French.36 Then Tagama undertook the construction of housing for Kawousan 
and his men, explaining that the building was destined to ‘héberger des hôtes 
illustres, de grands marabouts’.37 
 Kawousan’s army, which had to reach Agadez via Djado and Iférouwane, 
was made up of mainly Chaamba Arabs originally from southern Algeria, of 
Toubou and of Tuareg Kel Ajjer, Kel Ewey, Kel Fadey and Ikaskazen. With 
modern equipment (rapid-fire guns, machine guns and canons), the army was in 
a strong position to be able to recruit a large proportion of professional soldiers, 
notably deserters from the Italian army (askaris) and from French Saharan 
camelry units that had already gained some experience with modern warfare. 
 The first part of the column making up the advanced guard was led by the 
chief of a group of Tuareg Ikaskazen, Agali Touboushkouwan. They arrived in 
Agadez during the night of 12-13 December 1916. According to Tairou, the 
                                                 
33 Elhadj Aman Bougounou, Agadez, August 1985. 
34 Archives du Cercle d’Agadez, Commandant du Territoire au Commandant du Cercle 
d’Agadez: Note confidentielle no. 99 C du 14 avril 1916. On this point it seems 
dangerous to say that ‘le capitaine Bosch était sans doute de connivence avec le sultan 
Tagama’, Salifou, Kawousan, 62, note 83. There is no proof of this. 
35 Archives Nationales de France, Vincennes, Fonds A.O.F. Section Niger, V: Rapport 
du Capitaine Sabatié, commandant le poste d’Agadez sur le siège du poste, 13 décembre 
1916 au 3 mars 1917 inclus. p. 1-2. 
36 Elhadj Tourawa Mellé was Sarkin Tourawa (leader of the Arabs) and with this title 
was second in command under the Sultan. He was both Chief of War and Chief of 
Caravans of Bilma. 
37 Malam Yaro, Agadez, August 1985. 
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group of about 200 riflemen, who were received and put up by Tagama, 38 was 
made up of Ikaskazan, Kel Fadeye, Kel Tedele, Ifadeyan and Kel Ferwane. It 
was the following day that Tagama sent several missions to various tribal chiefs 
in order to win back Agadez. The Ikaskazan, Ifadayen, Kel Gharous, Kel 
Ferwane, Almousakarès and Kel Dinnik responded first and went to set up 
camp just outside the town. The same requests were sent to chiefs Moussa Ag 
Amastane of the Kel Ahaggar, Attati of the Esharifane, Kel Ewey and Kel 
Gres.39 Tagama then gave the order to stop all people who had contacts with the 
French: boys, cooks, interpreters, riflemen’s wives, and certain traders including 
the Tunisian negotiator Mohammed Allane. Most were held in prison, although 
a few, such as Samba the interpreter at the French post, were executed.40 
 Aghali’s army began to attack the post early in the morning of 13 December 
1916. Captain Sabatié, alerted by Samba’s widow, just had enough time to 
move arms, ammunition and money that had been left outside the keep. They 
organized the defence of the post with the equipment they had at their 
disposal.41 
 Kawousan reached Agadez with the main part of the column, the canon and 
the machine guns on 17 December: 
 
Le lendemain, grande palabre. Tégama préside, Agali et Kaossen y prennent part. 
Kaossen déclare être venu sur l’invitation de Tégama pour chasser les Français. 
Des messages écrits sont envoyés à toutes les tribus de l’Aïr, par les hommes de 
Tégama. Il y était dit que les Français allaient être détruits et chassés par la force; 
que ceux qui ne se déclareraient pas pour Tégama seraient considérés comme 
ennemis, attaqués et punis après la prise du poste d’Agadez. Au bout de quinze 
jours, le résultat était acquis : toutes les tribus s’étaient rendues à Agadez, plus ou 
moins volontairement. Les plus récalcitrantes (tels que les Kel Ewey) avaient été 
visitées par l’anastafidet Ekade et Kaossen lui-même. Un message avait été envoyé 
au Sultan de Kano pour le prévenir des événements qui allaient se passer.42 
                                                 
38 Archives Nationales du Niger, Niamey, 2-7-2. Déposition du Témoin Tairou, p. 1. 
39 Salifou, Kaoussan, 61. From a document by Malam Bohary Tanode d’Agadez à 
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41 Archives Nationales de France, Vincennes, A.O.F., Niger, V: Rapport du Capitaine 
Sabatié sur le siège d’Agadez, p. 6. 
  
42 Archives Nationales du Niger, Niamey, 2-7-2: Affaire Tégama, déposition du témoin 
Tairou, p. 2. 
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Tagama again seems to have played a pivotal role during the siege in a military, 
ideological and political sense. It was he who assembled the arms and 
ammunition, assumed the coordination of the operation and organized the 
fighting against the French troops sent to assist their soldiers.43 
Agadez was under siege, a state that would last for 80 days and even then the 
war would not be finished and would last for long months in the mountains, in 
Kawar and in Fezzan. This military episode is well known44 so our attention now 




Repercussions of the attack on Agadez on other regions 
 
The long Kawousan War provoked violent and open actions throughout the rest 
of the region. In the Azawak, Tamesna and Ahaggar, numerous groups of 
fighters soon joined Kawousan’s troops.45 Further to the south, participation by 
Damagaram, Damergou and Manga was invaluable, even decisive, in certain 
places. Control over this area, traditionally seen as the grain reserve of the 
northern region, was more than once at stake during the struggle, with both 
sides wanting to command access to it. The resistance forces were able to 
infiltrate the area and receive protection and assistance from the people near 
Gouré, Zinder and Madaoua.46 
 In the west of Niger and mainly in the subdivision of Filingué, the sedentary 
bella people in the cantons of Imanan and Tegraza were cautious following the 
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failure and repression of the revolt of Firhoun. They therefore had some 
reservations after the announcement of the siege of Agadez. The military 
precautions taken (and enforced by the French administration in Niamey), which 
included the disarming of the population and the sending of a reconnaissance 
patrol, hardly favoured a manifestation of open revolt.47 
 In neighbouring Nigeria, Governor Lugard received a telegram on 23 
December from Dakar informing him of the invasion of the French Sahara by 
the Sanûssi. A day later, news of the siege of Agadez arrived as well as a request 
from the Secretary-General of the AOF, Fournier, who demanded safe passage 
between Kano and Zinder for troops sent from Dakar. At the same time, 
Fournier informed Lugard of the instructions issued by the head of the military 
forces in Zinder to call on the nearby British garrison in case of emergency. 
Lugard, deeply concerned by the developing situation in Niger, declared a state 
of emergency on 3 January 1917. 
 Captain Faulque de Jonquières demanded reinforcements from Lugard in the 
middle of January 1917 and British colonial soldiers were given the role of 
protecting the sedentary zones of Tahoua, Maradi and Madaoua and of quashing 
any sign of incursion by resistance fighters in the south. Two British columns 
were sent to the military area in Niger. One, led by Colonel Coles, left Katsina 
with two mounted companies, one canon and two machine guns. The contingent 
arrived in Maradi on 13 January and received orders to meet at Tessaoua on 19 
January.48 The second column, coming from Sokoto, was commanded by 
Captain Randall and was made up of 65 riflemen on foot, a mounted company of 
85 men and two machine guns. It was sent to Tahoua where it arrived on 20 
January. Lugard did not want his men to intervene in the fighting around Ayir 
and their role was principally to offer help in patrolling and in setting up several 
mobile posts. After staying about four months in the military zone in Niger 
(from mid-January to mid-May 1917), the two British columns returned to their 
respective bases in Nigeria. 
 As a result of this cooperation with the British administration in Nigeria, the 
French had at their disposal some 2,000 extra riflemen, 8 machine guns, 6 
                                                 
47 Archives Nationales du Sénégal, 2G17-12. Rapport Politique, 2ème trimestre 1917; 
Archives Nationales du Niger, Cercle de Zinder. Rapport Politique du Cercle de Zinder, 
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48 Archives Nationales du Niger, Niamey; Lieutenant-Colonel Coles commandant la 
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Commissaire du Gouvernement Général au Territoire Militaire du Niger. Kaduna le I 
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canons, 394 camels, 109 mounted soldiers and 17 tonnes of equipment. This 
equipment would allow the French army to consolidate its positions in Niamey, 
Bilma, N’Guigmi, Filingué and Tahoua and to deploy more forces in the centre 
of the area of resistance49 with the men who were already in Ayir to liberate 
Agadez. 
 Alongside this military assistance, the British authorities adopted a number 
of political and administrative measures in areas adjacent to the military zones 
likely to assist the French: a reintegration of immigrant populations into the area, 
the policing of nomadic groups that were allied to the resistance movement, the 
requisitioning of camels, horses and porters for provisioning, a constant 
exchange of political information of the highest importance etc.50 
 What evidence is there of allegations about relations between the resistance 
leaders and Nigeria? The French authorities’ reports are based on 
correspondence found after the liberation of Agadez or from their intelligence 
agents. 
 The first item in the dossier would be Kawousan’s letter of October 1916 to 
his uncles El Hajj Mousa and Adambar in which he stated that the Germans and 
the Turks had to join forces at Kano with the columns coming down from 
Tripolitania.51 In May 1917, the chief of battalion, Laforge, asked the Ayir 
commander to order an inquiry ‘pour savoir si Kaossen au cours du siège 
d’Agadez a adressé des lettres ou envoyé des émissaires à des sultans de la 
Nigéria et plus particulièrement à celui de Kano’.52 
 Accusations were laid first against the Emir of Kano and then the Sultan of 
Sokoto. The chief colonial officer of Niger passed his information on to Lugard 
and Sarkin Musulmin of Sokoto would be constantly in touch with Kawousan to 
whom he had promised his help if the Sanûssi managed to enter the town.53 
Lugard wanted to verify all the details so set off on a journey to the north of 
                                                 
49 Colonial Office Records: 583/58/43044. Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins, ‘Report on the 
Situation on the Northern Frontier’, 25 juillet 1917. 
50 Archives Nationales du Sénégal, Dakar, 2G17-12, Niger à A.O.F. Rapport Politique, 
1er trimestre 1917, p. 14. 
51 Archives Nationales du Niger, Niamey, 2.7.2; Mangeot, ‘Le Siège d’Agadez’, 479-
82. 
52 Archives Nationales du Niger, Agadez. Note confidentielle, Chef de bataillon 
Laforgue chargé de l’expédition des affaires au Territoire militaire du Niger au 
commandant de la colonne de l’Aîr, Zinder le 10 mai 1917; M. Zbairu Kolo, ‘The 
Kawousan Rebellion of 1916-1918 with Particular Reference to its Impact on Northern 
Nigeria’, PhD thesis, Ahmadu Bello University (Zaria, 1973). 
53 J. Osuntokun, ‘The Response of the British Colonial Government in Nigeria to the 
Islamic Insurgency in the French Sudan and the Sahara during the First World War’, 
Bulletin de l’I.F.A.N, XXXVI, B, 1 (1974), 23. 
208 Idrissa 
Nigeria to check on the loyalty of the emirs vis-à-vis the British administration. 
No evidence of their relations with Kawousan or Tagama could be detected. 
 Alongside these rumours and police indications, the affirmation by Séré de 
Rivières and by Fuglestad should be mentioned, according to whom, before the 
end of the siege of Agadez, ‘des éléments sanûssi installés au Nigéria 
septentrional avaient organisé un convoi de ravitaillement destiné à Kaocen et 
ses hommes. Mais le convoi fut intercepté et capturé par un détachement 
français, assisté des Kanouri de Goudoumaria’.54 As far as oral tradition is 
concerned, the information is contradictory. While Elhadj Aman Bougounou 
remained quiet,55 the others were more outspoken: 
     
Tagama était en relation avec Sarkin Katsina qui confectionnait les gris-gris et les 
envoyaient à Agadez par des émissaires. Tagama a informé Sarkin Katsina du 
plan.56 
 
Finally, were relations between Kawousan, Tagama and the traditional 
authorities of northern Nigeria myth or reality? Undoubtedly the colonial 
authorities gave the question some thought. Whatever credit is placed on these 
sources, it is likely that the emirs of northern Nigeria would have been informed 
of the situation in Agadez. However, they reacted according to their own 
interests and to the situation in their own territories: with discretion and 
flexibility in Borno, Kano and Sokoto where Tagama had numerous contacts, 
but also with manifest opposition in Kabi which was clearly on the side of the 
colonial authorities. The situation was delicate for the emirs who had fresh and 
recent memories of the deportation to Ilorin of defeated colleagues who had 
collaborated in the revolts of 1915-1916. They had to proceed with caution and 
tact as ‘one never knows what will happen’. Their loyalties were divided 
between Islamic loyalty for their Muslim brothers and their loyalty vis-à-vis the 
administration. It was the latter which ultimately carried more weight. 
 
 
                                                
Interpretation 
 
The Kawousan War extended beyond traditional political players, witnessed the 
use of modern armaments and received support from external sources. The 
involvement of the many colonial powers of the time – France, Italy, Great 
Britain, Germany and Turkey – and the alliance with the Sanûssiya gave it an 
 
54 Fuglestad, ‘Les Révoltes des Touraeg’, 107; Séré de Rivières, Histoire du Niger, 226. 
55 Information Elhadj Aman Bougounou, Agadez. 
  
56 Information Malam Yaro, Agadez. 
 The Kawousan War reconsidered 209 
international dimension, which is probably why it attracted so much attention 
and was so widely debated by writers at the time. Four principle theses 
constitute the fundamental axes of the different approaches: (i) the bandits 
pillards (plundering bandits) theory; (ii) the révolte sénoussiste (Sénoussiste 
revolt) theory which emphasized the religious factors and attributed the 
Sanûssiya with a decisive role in the conflict; (iii) the war-against-the-French 
theory; and (iv) the modernist theory put forward by the leaders of political 
parties fighting for independence as well as the recent Tuareg rebellion in 
Niger. 
 
The ‘bandits pillards’ theory 
This interpretation does not consider the Kawousan War as a revolt but more as 
a raid, an opportunity to plunder and loot. Fuglestad, who supports this theory, 
wrote that the Kawousan War ‘ajouta seulement une bande supplémentaire à 
toutes les bandes qui parcouraient le pays’.57 He ignores the political dimension 
of the movement dismissing it as a simple pillaging operation that was 
essentially materialistic in origin. In this way he puts all Tuareg raiding actions 
down to reaction against colonial domination. At the same time it implies an 
ineptitude on the part of the Tuareg to rise above their internal rivalries to unite 
against a common enemy. This all translates into a profound misunderstanding 
of the double defence strategies adopted by the Tuareg from the outset of 
colonial penetration. This consisted in part of establishing internal and external 
alliances with a view to reinforcing their defences and also of organizing the 
raids against the enemy to weaken and defeat its army.58 Actions varied from 
escape and evasion (avoiding the enemy and playing for time) to armed 
resistance, but also the use of submission, diplomacy, underground tactics and 
exile. 
 
A Sénoussiste revolt? A Muslim plot? 
Islam, and the Sanûssiya in particular, have been considered by various writers 
as the driving force behind the Kawousan War. This interpretation came largely 
from colonial sources and was subsequently reproduced in numerous 
publications. Abadie spoke of the Mouvement Sénoussiste59 and for Séré de 
Rivières it was all about un complexe de guerre sainte (a complex religious 
war).60 André Salifou’s book was entitled Kaoussan ou la Révolte Sénoussiste, 
and one of the chapters in Norris’s book was ‘The Twareg Jihâd against the 
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French’.61 Finally Casajus describes the role of the religious engagement in the 
resistance.62 Clarification of the role of the Sanûssiya in this revolt involves 
returning to the political and ideological roots of the revolt and determining the 
nature of the alliance between the resistance and the Sanûssiya. 
 The Sanûssiya and their brothers – a group of individuals joined by the same 
doctrine and the same religious philosophy – were established in 1837 by 
Mohamed Ben Ali es Sanûssi el Hassani el Idrisi who was born in 1792 in 
Torch in Oranie.63 The Sanûssiya enjoyed considerable success and its leaders 
had complete authority throughout Libya and northern Chad. They had 
numerous disciples in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, eastern 
Sudan and Somalia and its influence spread through Mesopotamia as far as 
Indonesia. In Nigeria, the Kawar, the Ayir, the Damagaram and the Damergou 
were the main areas of Sanûssiya influence between 1860 and 1899. Many 
Zawiya including schools and mosques were founded in Bilma and Zinder and 
in the Ader and Ayir. 
 The Sanûssiya are orthodox and similar to the Wahhâbist order set up in 
Saudi Arabia at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Mohammed ibn 
Abd-al-Wahhab.64 The Sanûssiya and the Wahhâbites represented ‘les 
tendances conservatrices des mouvements islamiques prémodernistes de 
réforme’.65 Like the Wahhâbites, the Sanûssi can be identified by a rigorous 
adherence to a pure and primitive Islam, rejecting all that was introduced later 
including the cult of saints, tombs, relics etc. that are considered to negatively 
influence the true belief.66 The Sanûssiya totally reject the doctrine of union 
with God conceived by Sufism and substitute a mystical union with the spirit of 
the prophet Mohammed. This is the origin of the name Mohammediya tariqa 
sometimes given to the movement. It equally rejects Islamic intellectual 
tendencies and preaches a direct interpretation of its origins without erudition. 
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In addition, the Sanûssiya opt for the promotion of a moral and Islamic 
solidarity based on honesty, egalitarianism, Islamic cooperation and economic 
justice.67 They thus set up cooperative farms and undertook commercial 
activities. The Sanûssiya relied on the Zawiya, a monastic group with places 
where educational retreats could be held of a religious and cultural nature.68 
Except for these distinctive traits, the aims of Sanûssiya dogma were generally 
the same as other brotherhoods, especially regarding the step-by-step 
reunification of African Muslims and the creation of a Muslim empire that 
would be united, pure and respectful of the authentic teachings of the prophet. 
 It was with all these considerations in mind that the colonial authorities at 
the time called the brotherhood movement ‘xénophobe, militant, agressif et 
fanatique’ and ‘anti-européen’.69 In reality, the newly founded brotherhood 
wanted to affirm its orthodoxy in relation to existing practices that it considered 
tainted by pernicious influences. It wanted to withdraw from these and promote 
emigration or jihad (holy war) and to retreat into the austerity of the Sahel to 
preserve the purity of an original Islam. Subsequently its anti-colonial activities 
were more or less force of circumstance. 
 It was in the name of all these principles that the Sanûssiya established 
contact with the leaders of the Ayir. The strength of relations before the siege of 
Agadez between Tagama, Kawousan and Sanûssiya chiefs is acknowledged by 
oral tradition and colonial archive material. Sidi Mohammed El Labid, the 
representative of the Sanûssiya in Fezzan, wrote a letter dated 1914 to 
Tagama.70 The two had never met but their correspondence suggests a secret 
project dating from around this time. Let us now consider the position of the 
main leaders and the population vis-à-vis the Sanûssiya. 
 To fully appreciate Kawousan’s relations with the Sanûssiya, it is necessary 
to look at his time in exile and analyse the nature of the alliances he had with 
the different camps. What is most remarkable is the diversity of the alliances 
and the different volte-face. Kawousan always seems to have been guided by 
the need to set up and maintain a strong and modern army. This was the main 
motivation behind all his actions. He received arms from the Sanûssi who he 
helped fight against the French between 1909 and 1912, then from the French 
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with whom he fought from 1912 to 1915, then the Turks and finally again the 
Sanûssi during his stay in Tripolitania in 1916 before going to the Ayir region. 
Even after the retreat of resistance fighters outside Agadez (13 July 1917) and 
then from the Ayir (25 March 1918), he adopted the same attitude. Initially 
allied to the Turks in Fezzan, he then formed an alliance with the Sanûssi who 
provided him with significant quantities of arms and ammunition. Kawousan 
played this game of double alliances until the end and eventually it was the 
cause of his own death. Having received vital armaments from the Sanûssi, he 
wanted to conclude an alliance with the Turks in Tibesti. They, however, were 
aware of his tactics, and attacked, captured and hung him. 
 In this game of reverse alliances, there is no place for ideology and 
Kawousan did not concern himself with such trivialities. He was pragmatic, 
manipulating with a rare persuasive power the Sanûssi, the Turks, the French 
and the Italians depending on the circumstances. He no doubt fully understood 
the context of the colonial complexities in which each of the camps had its own 
colonial agenda. His references to Islam and to the holy war in his 
correspondence with Tagama and other Tuareg leaders is based on political 
propaganda. Kawousan knew that Islam alone could convince the population to 
accept resistance and enrol their children in his army. In the political context of 
the time, only Islam could play a unifying role because it could overcome 
internal political opposition within Tuareg groups. In this respect, Islam – and 
the Sanûssi – could only have had an instrumental function and did not assume 
any ideological role. Elsewhere, Kawousan always rose up against the blind 
fanaticism of fighters who wanted to engage in a holy war and pronounced 
religious incantations and honour against the bullets of adversaries. He wanted a 
well-structured and disciplined army with soldiers knowledgeable about the 
tactics of modern warfare, like those led by his European enemies.71 
 Regarding the position of Tagama, Bourgeot may have been right when he 
affirmed that ‘Tegama était probablement le plus senoussiste des dissidents – ce 
qui est inhérent à la fonction de sultan, qui doit assurer un rôle religieux?’72 In 
Agadez, only one informant could confirm Tagama’s affiliation with the 
Sanûssi with any certainty: 
 
Tagama a étudié au Borno et à Kano. Il était à Kano lorsqu’on fit appel à lui 
pour diriger le sultanat. C’est un grand musulman et un grand marabout. 
C’est une fois devenu sultan qu’il a été converti à la Sanûssiya par Sidikou, 
un marabout arabe de Ghât installé à Agadez.73 
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Elhadj Bougounou was more nuanced: 
 
Tagama sénoussiste? Non … C’est difficile de dire à quelle confrérie il appartenait. 
Il est musulman. C’est tout. C’était là la base de ses relations avec Kawousan. La 
raison du ralliement de Tagama à la révolte, c’est l’islam. Il ne pouvait accepter 
d’être un subordonné des Français, des Kafrs… C’est une guerre contre les 
Français qui voulaient imposer leur coutume et altérer l’islam. Au moment de tirer, 
les résistants s’écriaient: ‘La illaha illala, jihadi fi sabih allah’. C’était une jihad, 
pas pour le pillage ou le butin mais pour défendre l’islam. Les combattants ont fait 
la guerre aux Français mais pas aux musulmans.74 
 
This is a similar point of view to Malam Alfaki Almoustapha’s, according to 




Mou kori kafiray, mou samou kassan mou.  
Guerre aux kafrs, libérons notre pays.75  
 
This slogan agreed with the interests of the resistance fighters and Tagama. The 
rallying of Tagama to the resistance was in accordance with his political and 
religious beliefs. Were external threats not the main cause of the creation of the 
Sultanate? Ayir traditions bestowed the official title of Imam Amir-al-Mouminin 
(Commander of the Believers) on the Sultan. His legitimacy in the eyes of his 
people was related to his devotion to Islam. The fight also offered him the 
chance to increase his political power – limited until now – and to impose an 
authority weakened by political rivalries dividing the Kel Ayir. Alliances with 
Kawousan and above all with the Sanûssi allowed him to bask in his prestige. In 
this Muslim country, the words ‘Guerre aux Kafrs, libérons notre pays’ were 
mobilizing. It was a political programme that conformed to the immediate 
interests of the population. It was the religious and political duty of the Sultan to 
whom he had pledged to fight this war with the infidels and to liberate his 
country from French domination. This all conforms to the Islamic vision that 
divided the world into two domains: dar al islam (the land of Islam) and dar ek 
kufr (the land of the infidels). Islam demands that men live according to Muslim 
authorities. The power of the unfaithful over Muslims represents a situation of 
scandal in their faith. Islam preaches either jihad (holy war) or hijra 
(emigration) for believers in order to cleanse themselves of the power of the 
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infidel. Kawousan and Tagama opted for a holy war because it better fulfilled 
their purposes. Islam or Sanûssiya served to overcome political opposition, to 
assemble and mobilize the people, and to recruit fighters. 
 How did the people interpret this resistance? Firstly, popular history 
remembers this period by the name of Yakin Kawousan. This highlights the 
importance accorded to Kawousan, who is considered the one who won the war 
at Agadez and was seen as the main military leader. Secondly, when analysing 
the same oral sources, it becomes apparent that Tagama was showered in 
eulogies for the period prior to the resistance but judgements were severe and 
criticism harsh when one considers the revolt. The Sultan would have brought 
bad luck to Agadez by allying with Kawousan and by wanting to fight the 
French who were judged as being too powerful. Informants described the 
opinion of the people of Agadez at that time as follows: ‘Tagama ya cu ce mu’ 
meaning ‘Tagama has hurt us’.76 Oral tradition retains the negative character of 
the war to highlight the harsh repression that was endured by Agadez and the 
whole of the Ayir. Responsibility for this is laid squarely on the shoulders of 
Tagama who wanted to fight the French who were clearly too strong for him. 
The Ayir was ruined and the region lost half its population. However in no way 
was the resistance seen as a religious war supported by the Sanûssiya. 
 Between Tagama, Kawousan and the Sanûssiya there was a tactical alliance, 
a convergence of military, political, religious and economic interests. The 
Sanûssiya certainly supplied Kawousan’s army. However all the objective 
conditions of a revolt were laid down well before Kawousan and his men’s 
arrival in the Ayir. Identifying the resistance as a Sanûssiya movement appears 
to be too hasty a conclusion to draw and diminishes the complexity of the revolt 
at the same time as simplifying its meaning and its extent. To consider the 
Kawousan War as a Sénoussiste revolt tends to corroborate the thesis of a war 
led from outside by the Sanûssi supported by Turkish-German agents of which 
Kawousan was a part. Adherence to the Sanûssiya and adhesion to the 
resistance movement do not cover the same reality. This false interpretation of 
the revolt led the French troops to indiscriminately exterminate all Muslim 
groups in Agadez. More than 100 Muslim scholars assembled in a mosque were 
massacred in March 1917 even though they had told Colonel Mourin in a letter 
that they denied all responsibility for what had happened.77 
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An anti-French war? 
This theory sees the revolt as a simple prolongation of the First World War, a 
movement armed and financed by the Germans. For the French, the causes of 
the war were external. In their opinion, it was a vast Muslim plot supported 
ideologically by the Sanûssiya, and materially by Turkey and Germany.78 It is 
only colonial mythology that involves people like Dr Frobenius with the revolt 
and magnifies facts to make it appear as if the revolt was due to the power of 
the Sanûssiya or was an alleged holy war backed by a German-Turkish alliance 
to attack French bases in Africa.79 
 The authorities in Niger do not agree with this interpretation: 
 
…On ne peut guère admettre que ce soit là le vrai mobile qui ait poussé les 
insurgés. Il est vraisemblable et même probable que ces mouvements ont été 
encouragés par les nationaux allemands et turcs de la Tripolitaine, mais ces 
encouragements sont restés jusqu’ici purement platoniques ou tout au moins de bien 
faible importance. Il n’y a pas de lien entre la guerre européenne et les événements 
de l’Aïr. Les causes sont purement locales.80  
 
Two further reasons allow the European war and the Kawousan War to be 
separated. The Sanûssiya, as already mentioned, were militarily weak and 
politically in crisis. Additionally, any Sanûssiya alliance with a particular 
European country should not be overestimated. Sanûssiya alliances during the 
war experienced various fluctuations: they fought against the English in Egypt 
and in Sudan, then against the Italians in Libya until 1928. In 1943 they 
collaborated with the English and the French against the Italians in Libya. 
 
The War of Kawousan and contemporary nationalist movements 
For the leaders of the political parties who fought for independence and for the 
leaders of the recent Tuareg rebellion in Niger, there was more continuity 
between the different periods of resistance. They all identified with the 
Kawousan War. The Sawaba party led by Djibo Bakary declared in one of its 
publications: 
 
C’est de ce passé glorieux [les résistances anticoloniales], parfois douloureux et 
dramatique, que nous pouvons puiser à la fois des leçons de courage et de 
patriotisme et des éléments nécessaires pour réhabiliter notre culture et notre 
Histoire…N’étaient-ce pas les valeureux guerriers de l’Aîr, conduits par Kaoussen 
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et Tegama, qui, en 1916 infligèrent aux troupes françaises de dures défaites et 
vinrent mettre le siège devant Agadez où les Français durent s’enfermer dans un 
fort?81 
 
The leaders of the Tuareg rebellion in Niger established a link between the anti-
colonial revolts and recent rebellions. They have made a personalized history of 
Tuareg society based on the Kawousan War and still see this event as a step in 
the long process of a search for a certain modernity at the heart of Tuareg 
society in which the rebellion was inscribed and which continues to this day. 
Kawousan is considered as having brought an egalitarian society and 
democratic opposition to the conservatism represented by the aristocracy who 
wanted to maintain a social hierarchy directed by the old code of honour. 
Kawousan has been given the role of liberator, the federator seen as the unifier 





The Kawousan War was undoubtedly the longest period of resistance ever 
known in Niger’s previous military history, extending beyond colonial frontiers 
and even traditional politics. However, its root causes were purely internal, 
linked to colonial domination and to local economic and political factors. 
Economically, the Ayir region had faced a long period of decline in the living 
conditions of the local pastoralists and agro-pastoralists whose wealth was 
principally based on the trans-Saharan caravan trade that was declining 
significantly due to military operations in the area. French colonization had 
upset the way of life of these populations by the introduction of a policy of 
divide and rule, the breakdown of Tuareg confederations, the imposition of a 
policy of sedentarization, the creation of artificial political unities, the 
suppression of lines of bondage and the trafficking in slaves, the introduction of 
a double tax (a poll tax and a tax on cattle) and the huge requisitioning of men 
and livestock. In the eyes of the locals, these changes symbolized the 
establishment of dependent relationships and by extension, a policy of 
dependency and of servitude. 
 Neither a raid conducted by bandits pillards nor a Sénoussiste revolt, the 
Kawousan War was more than a simple Tuareg revolt. It was an anti-colonial 
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war through which the local populations attempted to free themselves from the 
yoke of colonialism and in particular French domination that had resulted in the 
loss of their main source of wealth – control of (trans) Saharan resources and 
trade – as well as their political independence. 
 
